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BOOK REVIEW
Discriminating Against Discrimination. By Robert M. O'Neil,'
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Pp. 271.
Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public
Policy. By Nathan Glazer, 2 New York: Basic Book, Inc., 1975. Pp.
248.
Reviewed by Mack A. Player3
The term "affirmative action," one of the newer abstractions in
our legal jargon, quickly inflames sane persons to debate everything
from the merits of compensatory justice to the evils of "reverse
discrimination." Two recent books, DiscriminatingAgainst
Discriminationby Robert M. O'Neil and Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy by Nathan Glazer, examine, without exhausting, this elusive term.
Soon after Brown v. Board of Education,4 the courts discovered
that simple institutional neutrality, or nondiscrimination, would
not erase the continuing effects of past, officially imposed racial
segregation. In addition to nondiscrimination (known in the South
as "freedom of choice"), discriminating institutions were obliged to
take positive, affirmative steps to proselytize their new, nondiscriminatory direction.5 This outreach could be called Phase I of affirmative action. Phase II of affirmative action was created when courts
required institutions to take steps to remedy their past violations of
the law. Exercising their broad remedial powers, courts imposed on
a wrongdoer such remedies as racially proportional school districts"
and black-white hiring ratios.'
Affirmative action did not stop there, however. Executive agenExecutive Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Cin.
cinnati College of I.w. A.B. 1956, A.M. 1957, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University.
2 Professor of Education and Social Structure, Harvard University. B.S.S. 1944. City
College of New York; M.A. 1944, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. 1962, Columbia University.
Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1963, Drury College; J.D. 1965. University
of Missouri; LL.M. 1972, George Washington University.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Clark
v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
See Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
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cies, obsessed with statistical underrepresentation of minorities, imposed upon private contractors a virtual requirement of proportional representation in each workplace according to race, ethnic
heritage, and sex." By curious logic, school systems had to integrate
according to the racial representation in the system in order to
refrain from discriminating, 9 and employers who had less than a
proportionate work force had the perhaps impossible burden of
proving a negative-that they were not discriminating." This is
Phase III, the aspect of affirmative action addressed by Professors
Glazer and O'Neil.
Prior to 1960 the liberal legal community argued that the Constitution was colorblind and that the color of skin was not a proper
factor in the selection of students or workers. Supporting the 1970's
version of Phase III affirmative action required a change in theme.
Supporters of "benign" discrimination, racial goals, preferences,
and double standards set forth numerous reasons why the Constitution was not really as colorblind as had been asserted and that the
color of skin is sometimes relevant in selecting pupils and employees." Conservatives, on the other hand, screamed, "You told us the
Constitution was colorblind!" Herein lies the debate.
In the narrow context of pupil selection in higher education, Robert M. O'Neil, in DiscriminatingAgainst Discrimination,supports
dual admission programs that will increase the representation of
blacks and other minorities in higher education. A major portion of
the book outlines the history of the DeFunisv. Odegaardlitigation; 2
the last one-third is simply a reprint of the decisions from the Washington supreme court and the United States Supreme Court; the
balance is little more than an amicus curiae brief containing fairly
stock arguments in support of preferential admissions to schools of
higher learning. The book offers little insight, except for an attorney
who is preparing (for the first time) a defense of a school's dual
admissions program.
Nathan Glazer's book, Affirmative Discrimination:Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy, is much more catholic in its appeal. In.
See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), implemented in 41 C.F.R. Ch.
60 (1975).
See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
" See Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Parham v. South Western
Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
" See Edwards, Race Discriminationin Employment: What Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL.
L. F. 572 (1976).
1182 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), dismissed as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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recent times unions, employers, school boards, white employees,
and parents of all backgrounds have objected to the 1970's Phase III
of affirmative action, viewing it as a double standard, a reverse
reimposition of color codes. The problems of "reverse" racial preferences have been outlined before; 3 objections are often cavalierly
dismissed as motivated by self-interest, corrupted by lack of concem, or tainted by unreconstructed racism. Nonetheless, Glazer's
book adds a new historical-sociological dimension to the discussion.
Professor Glazer provides articulate support for those who have been
stuttering that affirmative action is wrong but have been unable to
state objections more profound than "It just ain't right." Glazer
traces a dominant sociological thesis of America: America is a nation committed to ethnic neutrality; we are committed to be a nation open equally to all peoples; we have maintained that once a
citizen, each person, regardless of national origin, shares equally the
rights and duties of citizenship; national policy has rejected giving
ethnic groups independent polity (as exists to some degree in Canada and many European states); groups have no political rights as
groups; at the same time all citizens are given the freedom to develop and maintain their old world heritage or to abandon that
heritage, lose their ethnic identity, and become assimilated. Professor Glazer argues that the emerging trend of affirmative action in
education, employment, and housing is contrary to and destructive
of this basic historical commitment to ethnic neutrality. Affirmative action places a premium upon individual membership in ethnic
groups. Each ethnic group is given an independent and usually
competing right. Self-defense forces individuals into artificial continuation of their ethnicity. Glazer believes that this is unnecessary
to insure equal opportunity and destructive of the basic American
sociological structure.
O'Neil's arguments for affirmative action and Glazer's arguments
against it are made with an all-or-nothing attitude. Neither makes
the subtle distinctions that can perhaps differentiate and justify
varying shades of modem affirmative action. For example, in supporting racially conscious admissions standards in educational institutions, O'Neil correctly points out that race and ethnic heritage
can be one of the many valid ingredients in the complex educational
"3 See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro-The Problem
of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rav. 363 (1966).

HeinOnline -- 11 Ga. L. Rev. 253 1976-1977

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
formula. Factors other than pure academic performance have long
been utilized by school administrators in selecting a student body:
athletic ability, geographic distribution, career interests, leadership
qualities, family or political connections. Adding race and ethnic
heritage as a factor is equally appropriate. Indeed, an affirmative
action program requiring a mix of race and background would increase the exposure of students and faculty to new ideas and outlooks and would have an internaleffect on the quality of education
received by all students. However, assumptions about the external
effect of professional education, often made in support of racial
preferences and repeated by O'Neil-patterns of discrimination
cannot be removed without preferences; preferences will increase
delivery of professional services to the minority communities; success of minority persons will provide models for emulation-are
unproved and perhaps false (a fact Glazer notes). Yet O'Neil would
give these supposed external effects dignity equal to internal impact
on the educational program. Herein lies the oversimplification, if
not the error: Internal discretion based on valid educational judgments should be distinguished from unsupported assumptions relating to noneducational, external economic or social goals.
While O'Neil takes the "all" approach to ethnic preferences,
Glazer prefers a "nothing" approach. Glazer, too, fails to make
distinctions between decisions to serve valid internal, institutional
needs on the one hand and decisions imposed to further some external goal on the other. Internal justifications for ethnic considerations do exist in education. Even in the employment setting internal
needs may occasionally justify ethnic discrimination by an employer. A governmental agency charged with resolving the problems
of American Indians may operate more effectively, for example, by
employing as many Indians as possible;' 4 a church or social action
organization may be better able to reach certain groups by employing members of those groups. Where an employer's own needs justify the racial preference, they should be honored. Most ethnic discrimination in employment, however, unlike in education, cannot
be justified by internal results; only by reference to external social
goals can most color discrimination in employment be justified.
Glazer condemns external justification for discrimination with documentation and logic but fails to recognize the arguable validity of
internal justifications.
" See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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Both authors fail to ascribe any relevance to the source of the
affirmative action policies. Effective operation of institutions and
the discretion to make decicions relating to that operation are important societal goals. Thus, distinctions can be drawn between
policies that are internally generated pursuant to institutional discretion and policies that are imposed from the outside against the
will of the institution, frustrating the exercise of discretion.
O'Neil's DiscriminatingAgainst Discriminationis a narrow book
that provides little new legal insight. Nathan Glazer's Affirmative
Discrimination,however, provides refreshing analysis of the broad
area of affirmative action and so-called "reverse discrimination."
Because it attacks liberal assumptions and current judicial trends,
it is controversial. It is not intended to be a complete legal analysis
of this complex area of the law, and it is not. It is, however, a book
of our times well worth reading.
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